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To spur innovation, the patent protection system grants the patentee limited monopoly power
to recoup his RDinvestment, although, in general, allowing the use of the public good
"innovation" is socially efficient. But patents and patent threats can also be used strategically,
e.g. to deter entry from competitors. This note shows that, besides incumbency, the present
patent protection system constitutes an additional strategic instrument that favors the
incumbent, because asymmetric litigation costs may deter entry from potential rivals.
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To promote innovation, the patent system grants the patentee (temporary) monopoly
power to exploit the innovative good or production process. Nordhaus’ (1969, 1972)
seminal contributions analyzed the trade-oﬀ between setting incentives to spur innova-
tion by granting a monopoly and the social cost this monopoly entails by restricting
the access to knowledge, which is, by deﬁnition, a public good. He also introduced the
concepts of “patent length” (the duration of the monopoly) and “patent breadth” (the
scope of the patent).
The following literature considered the optimal trade-oﬀ between a patent’s length
and its scope, which turned out to be highly sensitive with respect to the model spec-
iﬁcation of the patent breadth. If increasing competition is socially desirable (e.g., if
competition bears little cost) inﬁnite length and narrow patents are optimal, as in the
homogenous good model with Bertrand competition of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). If
competition involves some costs, as in the product diﬀerentiation model of Klemperer
(1990), the optimal mix may involve maximum patent breadth.1 “Optimality” in this
strand of literature refers to the socially optimal way of compensating the innovator
for his innovating eﬀort, which is assumed to be exogenously given.
Yet patents may also be used to other aims. Empirical surveys by Levin et al. (1987)
and Cohen et al. (2000) about the returns of innovation in many diﬀerent industries
conclude that the positive eﬀect of being ﬁrst to market a product and of dominating
the innovating technology far outweighs the beneﬁts of the patent’s monopoly rent.2
Patents may also be used as bargaining chips in cross-licensing deals or within other
strategic settings.
In Gilbert and Newbery (1982) patents are used strategically by a monopolist as an
entry deterrence instrument. Preemptive innovation and subsequent patenting is used
by ﬁrms to prevent competition. Thus, Rank Xerox patented a range of inventions,
some of which were never used nor licensed, in order to maintain its monopoly position.3
Reinganum (1983) added uncertainty about the R&D success to the strategic setting
of Gilbert and Newbery and showed that an entrant may have a higher incentive to
invest in R&D than an incumbent, while Yi (1995) showed how this strategic incentive
depends on how R&D is modeled.
In the last years, there has been a surge both in patent ﬁlings and especially in
patent litigation (see Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). In the 1990s, Texas Instruments leaded
the ﬁeld in asserting its patent rights in court and other big ﬁrms like AT&T, IBM,
1See also Waterson (1990), Gallini (1992) and Wright (1999). Denicolo (1996) and Takalo (2001)
survey these optimal patent models.
2The pharmaceutical industry being an important exception.
3A patent that is not used nor licensed is called a “sleeping” or “submarine” patent.and Motorola followed. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) analyze the relationship
between patent ﬁlings and patent litigation by combining data from U. S. patent court
cases with data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce. They argue that patent
enforcement costs are higher and litigation rewards smaller for smaller startup ﬁrms
when compared with bigger incumbents.
The present note analyzes this relationship between patent ﬁlings and patent litiga-
tion in a game theoretic entry model in the tradition of Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980).
We extend the strategic entry deterrence model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) to in-
clude litigation with an uncertain outcome. Innovating ﬁrms often have a monopoly
position in their markets and they have thus a greater rent to lose (the monopoly rent)
than a potential entrant has to gain (the duopoly rent). The present patent protec-
tion system and the subsequent litigation may protect the incumbent monopolist from
entry in another way, because the costs and the rewards of litigation are not evenly
distributed among the incumbent and the challenger.
The ﬁling of a patent for an incumbent monopolist M entails only a small cost and
leads to higher costs for potential entrants (Gallini, 1992). The entrant E carries the
burden of proof that the patent is not valid (e.g. because there is “prior art”4). In
addition, if E is successful and the patent is subsequently declared void, often there is
no ﬁne or sanction mechanism for M, other than the possible litigation costs of E that
M may have to pay. Since in practice most cases end in an agreement out of court (see
Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001), the incumbent M often has much smaller litigation
costs than the entrant E.
Several high-proﬁle patent cases follow this pattern where an established incumbent
registers a patent (whose innovative content is questionable) in order to defend its
monopoly position. Amazon.com has patented its “One-Click-Shopping” as a “Method
and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network”, which was
widened to cover the possibility of buying online an item that is delivered as a gift to a
third person.5 This “One-Click”-patent was used against Amazon’s biggest competitor
Barnes & Noble. The process of adding several items to a virtual shopping cart and of
paying all items together when checking out has been patented by Sun Microsystems as
a an “Electronic Shopping Cart” for a “Network Sales System”.6 Again, one can argue
that the innovation is trivial and was there before the patent was registered.
Our aim is to show, in a entry game as simple as possible, how the present patent
4Prior art is the body of publicly available knowledge as shown in in earlier patents and other
published material. To be patentable, an invention has to be novel and non-obvious with respect to
prior art, see title 35 of the US Code, Sections 102 and 103.
5See US patent number 5,960,411 and the European patent number 927,945 at the
http://www.uspto.gov/ and http://www.european-patent-office.org/.
6US patent numbers 5,745,681 and 5,909,492, and European patent numbers 807,891 and 803,105.
2protection system with asymmetric litigation costs may be used strategically as an entry
deterrence instrument by an incumbent to protect his monopoly. The paper proceeds
as follows. In the next section we describe the entry game where the incumbent ﬁrm
may ﬁle for a patent within a given patent protection system. Section 3 shows how the
asymmetric distribution of costs and rewards constitutes an additional advantage for
the incumbent. The last section summarizes the main results and suggests some policy
results.
2 The strategic entry game
Suppose there is initially a single, risk neutral ﬁrm M who has a monopoly in a given
market and faces a demand
p = a − bX (1)
where X is the total amount of the good sold in the market, p is its unit price, a and
b are positive parameters. The good X can be produced at constant marginal cost of
c>0,c < a. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no ﬁxed costs in
production.
There is a potential entrant ﬁrm E. M has the possibility to register a patent for
the good X itself or for the production process of good X. It cannot evaluate in an
objective way the true innovative value of X, speciﬁcally if the invention really “novel”
and not “obvious” in the light of “prior art”. The innovation can be patented at a
negligible cost which will be assumed to be zero.7
Due to the patent a potential entrant is not legally allowed to use the patented
innovation. But it may circumvent the patent by inventing an alternative production
process leading to a perfect substitute for good X. T h i sm a ys p e c i a l l yb et h ec a s e
if the innovative content of the innovation is not really novel. With this alternative
technology, an entrant can produce a perfect substitute for X, possibly at slightly
higher marginal cost λc, λ ≥ 1, than the incumbent.
When the original innovating monopolist realizes that it is being imitated by an
entrant, it may sue the rival ﬁrm for patent infringement. A patent court decides in
favor of the innovating monopolist with probability ρ, and with the residual probability
1 − ρ it exculpates the imitating entrant from patent infringement. The court then
imposes the cost of litigation on the losing party, FM on the innovating monopolist and
FE on the imitating entrant. This payment can be interpreted in a general way as the
cost of the lawsuit, a ﬁne to be paid by the losing party, or as the compensation cost
7Patent oﬃces usually do not check the validity of a patent and restrict themselves to ﬁling the
patent registration.
3paid to the other party. If the patent is declared void, the entrant can use the same
technology of the monopolist at the same marginal cost c. If the patent is upheld by
the court, the entrant has to leave the market.
Our crucial assumption is that litigation costs are higher for the imitating entrant
than for the innovating monopolist, e. g. FM <F E, if only because the former carries
the burden of proof that the alternative technology does not infringe the registered
patent. Our litigation setting assumes, for the sake of simplicity, that both players
have the same a-priori expectation about the litigation outcome. Although in principle
the innovating monopolist may be better informed, it is not always easy to judge in an
objective way whether an innovation is a truly innovative or not. Besides, the aim of
the patent is to strategically deter entry and thus, the innovation aspect is not central
to it. Finally, lawsuits’ outcomes are notoriously diﬃcult to predict.
Thus, we consider the following game:
1. The innovating ﬁrm chooses whether to register or not a patent for X.
2. A rival ﬁrm decides whether to enter the market and imitate the monopolist.
3. If there is no entry, the incumbent produces the monopoly output and the game
ends. If there is entry, the incumbent may sue the entrant for patent infringement.
4. If the incumbent has chosen litigation, a court (nature) determines in the fourth
stage whether there has been patent infringement or not.
5. In the ﬁnal stage production takes place: either the two ﬁrms play a Nash-Cournot
game in output or the incumbent monopolist produces the monopoly output.
3 The strategic use of patents under asymmetric liti-
gation costs
Consider the extensive form of this imperfect information game as given in Figure 1.
To ﬁnd its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we solve backwards starting
with the Nash-Cournot market game in the ﬁnal stage. We skip the straightforward
calculations for the monopoly and duopoly games8 and summarize the players’ payoﬀs
in Figure 1. The upper and lower payoﬀs are the payoﬀs of the incumbent and the
entrant ﬁrm, respectively. The expected payoﬀ of litigation for the incumbent (ΠI)






















































Notation: I = incumbent ﬁrm, E = potential entrant, C = patent court. The upper and lower
payoﬀs are the payoﬀs of the incumbent I and the entrant E, respectively. ρ is the probability
the court C upholds the patent.
Figure 1: The strategic patent game: Extensive form
Depending on the speciﬁc parametrization (the demand properties a and b,t h em a r g i n a l
cost c, the additional cost factor λ, and the litigation costs FM and FE), we may obtain
diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes. We are interested in situations where the incumbent has
an incentive to ﬁle for a patent and where this patent may successfully deter the rival
from entering the market. The following two propositions show that under plausible
assumptions this might be the case in a large number of situations.
Proposition 1 (Entry without patent)
If the incumbent does not register for a patent, then entry by the rival ﬁrm and duopoly
is an SPNE in dominant strategies.
Proof. If there is no patent threat, the incumbent is not able to deter entry and in
our game, any other threat is not credible. For the potential rival ﬁrm, entry delivers
a duopoly rent, since it is the incumbent’s best response to accommodate to the new
5duopoly situation. QED.
Proposition 2 (Entry deterrence)
Assume that the patent court decides with a fair coin (ρ =0 .5) and that both players
have equal marginal cost (λ =1 ). If FM <F E (asymmetric litigation costs) and
the potential Cournot oligopoly rent is smaller than the cost diﬀerence of litigation
FE − FM, then the strategy no-entry by the rival ﬁrm and incumbent monopoly is an
SPNE.
Proof. By direct calculation, since in this situation the incumbent would always
sue for patent infringement and the expected litigation cost for the entrant is greater
than the expected duopoly rent. QED.
Notice that the outcome described in Proposition 2 is a “sustainable” equilibrium
in the sense of Baumol et al. (1982), where there is no proﬁtable entry for a potential
rival ﬁrm.9
4 Conclusion and policy implications
This note analyzes the situation where a patented innovation may not be truly innova-
tive. The patentee uses the patent as a strategic instrument against a potential entrant.
This strategic incentive may be exacerbated by the patent protection system, which
poses asymmetric litigation costs on the incumbent patentee and the potential entrant
to the market. Entry is deterred leading to higher monopoly prices and welfare losses.
If the patented good or process is not really novel and the “innovation” deserves no
patent protection, eﬃciency would require that no patent is granted at all.
Two possible solutions are the following. First, the incentives of the present patent
protection system, which asymmetrically favor the original patentee, could be changed
by increasing the sanctions on ﬁrms that register innovations that are not truly in-
novative. This would reduce the asymmetry of the litigation costs. In practice, the
sanctions for patenting a patent which is subsequently declared void are very small,
specially when compared with the gains from the patent monopoly. A second, diﬀerent
approach would be to require the patent oﬃce not just to register the patent applica-
tions, but to engage in an evaluation process, instead of leaving this judgement to the
courts. This approach has two advantages with respect to the present system: Since
there are no litigation costs involved, the evaluation is less costly. Additionally, all
patents are evaluated and not only those patents that are contested in court. These
solutions would reduce the incentive to use patents as strategic instruments and would
conﬁne patents to their original aim, namely to spur and reward true innovations.
9For an exact deﬁnition of sustainability, see Chapter 8 in Baumol et al. (1982).
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